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oddělení analytické filosofie Filosofického ústavu AV ČR

uvádí

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**SENSA
PHENOMENA
QUALIA**

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Consider the peanut butter jar lid in front of me. I see that it is round and of a uniform red colour all over. But these facts as such are not presented to me by my eyes alone. I (or my visual system) have to infer (or otherwise process) these facts about the lid based on what the senses do present: The lid appears not round, but oval in my visual field and the redness of the top part of the lid appears several shades lighter than that of the vertical side, whose colour appearance is further variegated both because it is ridged and because it is round and so light falls on it differentially. That redness the senses present to me is something that I am immediately conscious of but cannot describe in words very well - someone who has not experienced it would not know exactly what it is like, but I know all about it in virtue of having the experience I have. I may be wrong about the colour of the lid: perhaps it is not red but green and the inverted-spectrum-mad-surgeon has visited me in the night. But I cannot be wrong about the colour(s) it seems to have. That sensation of redness is something I can have both in veridical experiences and in illusions and hallucinations and is, in some way, one of the components my visual consciousness is made of.

A familiar story. And a false one, I argue. The notion of sensation we are supposed to intuitively and immediately get from the story is, in fact, a heterogeneous idea born of three quite different sorts of (mostly abductive) arguments belonging to three quite disparate theories. I don't think any of these inferences are very good, but the focus of this paper is to argue that there is no reason to suppose that a single sort of theoretical entity - sensation - will, or indeed could, fulfill all three roles.